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The purpose of this paper is to comment on a recent paper by Frank (1970) . Figure 1 is based on Frank's figure 3, where the axes measure the face value of a loan L and the rate of interest on the loan r. The opportunity cost of capital in the donor is constant at p. The opportunity cost of capital in the recipient country declines along q(L) as more is lent because of declining returns to capital, but never falls below p.1
The curves C1D1 and C9D., represent iso-benefit curves to the recipient. A1B1 is an iso-benefit curve for the donor (negative grant value), and A2B2 is an iso-cost curve for the donor (positive grant value).2 The curves A1Bj and C1D1 have a point of tangency at P2. Similarly, A2B2 and C2D2 have a point of tangency at P1. The set of all such points of tangency forms a contract curve EF. The curve EF represents combinations of terms of lending and amounts of lending which are Pareto optimal. That is, both donor and recipient are better off at some point on the contract curve than at a point off the curve." [Frank 1970 [Frank , p. 1110 The first mistake of the above argument is that the curve, C1D1 cannot bend backward (have a negative slope) as drawn in figure 1. The reason is simple. Below the line q(L), the recipient would like to get more loan at given rate of interest. Compare the point P3 with P2. Since P3 involves a larger loan at lower interest rate, the recipient must be better off at P3 than at P,. Hence P2 and P3 cannot be on the same indifference curve. To maintain indifference, a point of higher L must involve higher r, hence the indifference curves must be positively inclined. And since the iso-benefit curves (such as A1B1) of the donor must be negatively inclined, the two sets of curves cannot have point of common tangency. For the segment For any point within this segment, the benefit to the recipient is higher than the cost to the donor, as q is greater than p. The marginal rate of substitution (absolute value) between L and -r will be greater for the recipient than the donor. For any point within OMNp, there is a point on (and also many points above, as will be seen shortly) MN where both parties are better off. This is only to be expected, as capital has a higher return in the recipient country up to N. The indifference curves will, therefore, be as depicted in figure 2. Above If we accept Frank's assumption (p. 1112) that the recipient can always borrow a smaller amount at the same rate of interest, so that the segment above NS is not sustainable, the contract curve/surface is the line RN plus the whole surface above MN:R is the point where the line NS, which is the same as line q(L) in figure 2, touches the highest iso-benefit curve (A2B2) for the donor. If we assume, instead, that the receipient has to face a package (amount of loan and rate of interest) deal, the segment above NS is then relevant. In this case, the contract surface is that above the line MNQ but to the left of the recipient's indifference curve DoS which represents zero benefit to the recipient.
From the above analysis, it may be concluded that Frank is quite incorrect in drawing his contract curve EF below the point N. According to our analysis, as q > p before N is reached, points below the line MN cannot be Pareto optimal.
